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DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS 




Corporate governance reform has often focused on the need for, and 
the role of, independent directors on the board. The rules of the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) re-
quire that listed companies (1) include a majority of independent direc-
tors on the board2 and (2) allow only independent directors to serve on 
the audit, compensation, and nominating committees.3 Delaware law 
does not require the use of independent directors but does provide greater 
deference to decisions by boards that do.4  
Under Delaware law,5 directors typically lack independence when 
they receive a material financial income stream from the company.6 Di-
rectors can also lose their status as independent as a result of business 
and personal relationships with management.7 Nonetheless, the courts 
have evidenced impatience with challenges to independence on these 
  
 * J.D., Dec. 2014, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
 2. N.Y.S.E. Listed. Co. Manual. § 303A.01 (2013); Nasdaq Listing Rules 5605(b)(1) (2009). 
 3. N.Y.S.E. Listed. Co. Manual §§ 303A.04(a), .05(a), .07(a) (2013); Nasdaq Listing Rules 
5605(c)(2)(A) (2010); Nasdaq List. R. 5605(d)(2)(A) (2013); Nasdaq List. R. 5605(e)(1) (2013); 
Nasdaq List. R. 5605(e)(5) (2013). 
 4. See infra notes 9-10. 
 5. The stock exchanges use similar definitions of independence. Under N.Y.S.E. Listed Co. 
Manual § 303A.02 (2013), “no director qualifies as ‘independent’ unless the board of directors 
makes an affirmative determination that the director has no material relationship with the listed 
company.” In addition, directors lack independence under the listing standard if they fall within a 
number of categorical exclusions, including (1) serving as an employee of the company; (2) receiv-
ing over $120,000 in direct compensation in any one year period over the last three years, excluding 
directors fees; (3) partnering or being employed by a firm that is the listed company’s internal or 
external auditor; (4) acting as an executive officer of another company where any of the listed com-
pany’s present executive officers at the same time serve on the company’s compensation committee; 
and (5) operating as an employee of a company that has made payments to, or received payments 
from, the company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three years, ex-
ceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company’s consolidated gross revenues. Id. 
Delaware, however, does not recognize these categorical rules. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 
496, 510 (Del. Ch. 2013) aff'd sub nom., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) 
(“Although the fact that directors qualify as independent under the NYSE rules does not mean that 
they are necessarily independent under our law in particular circumstances[.]”). 
 6. Independence in Delaware depends upon the identity of the interested director. See J. 
Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: "Independent" Directors and the Elimination of the 
Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 72-73 (2007). In most cases, the CEO qualifies. Id. The ability of 
the CEO to terminate material income streams paid by the company will therefore raise reasonable 
doubt about the recipient’s independence. Id. 
 7. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
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grounds and have, therefore, provided little guidance on the types of per-
sonal relationships that disqualify directors. 
A recent case, however, has deviated from this usual approach. In In 
re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,8 the court suggested 
that long-lasting personal relationships involving close connections to the 
family of the controlling shareholder may deprive a director of independ-
ence. The decision, therefore, provided guidance on the types of relation-
ships a board should examine in considering director independence. The 
case also illustrated some of the risks to boards that treat directors with 
close personal ties to management as independent. Finally, the case may 
influence a board’s disclosure obligations under the federal securities 
laws.  
This article contains six sections. Section II introduces the function 
of independent directors in conflict of interest transactions and derivative 
suits and the definition the Delaware courts use to evaluate independ-
ence. Section III explains the courts’ unwillingness to find that personal 
and outside business relationships invalidate directors’ independence. 
Section IV highlights that in a pair of recent cases, the Delaware courts, 
for the first time, provided some insight into the types of personal con-
nections that could be disqualifying. Section V describes the potential 
impact of these decisions on Delaware law and their possible influence 
on the disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws. In addi-
tion, Section V provides empirical insight into how public companies are 
implementing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
stock exchange requirements regarding consideration and disclosure of 
personal and business relationships.  Finally, Section VI concludes that 
increased disclosure of these relationships, under the federal securities 
laws, will provide shareholders with the necessary information to chal-
lenge board independence despite the usual absence of discovery in this 
context and may result in a reduction in the nomination of directors with 
personal and business relationships with management.  
II. DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE UNDER DELAWARE LAW 
a. The Benefits of Director Independence 
Delaware does not require the use of independent directors.9 The 
courts, however, provide greater judicial deference to the decisions of 
boards that do.10 First, the presence of independent directors can affect 
  
 8. 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2014) (“The certificate of incorporation or bylaws 
may prescribe other qualifications for directors.”). 
 10. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 937 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he appropriate inquiry is 
whether Blasband's amended complaint raises a reasonable doubt regarding the ability of a majority 
of the Board to exercise properly its business judgment in a decision on a demand had one been 
made at the time this action was filed.”). 
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the standard of review for transactions arising under the duty of loyalty. 
Rather than apply entire fairness, boards with a majority of independent 
directors typically receive the benefit of the business judgment rule for 
conflicts involving a director11 and a shift in the burden of showing fair-
ness for conflicts involving a controlling shareholder.12 
Secondly, courts are more willing to dismiss derivative suits against 
boards with a majority of independent directors. In filing a derivative 
suit, a shareholder generally must make a demand on the board.13 De-
mand will, however, be excused where the board lacks a majority of in-
dependent directors.14 
b. Director Independence Defined 
Independence exists where “a director’s decision is based on the 
corporate merits of the subject . . . rather than extraneous considerations 
or influences.”15 The director must make decisions “without regard for or 
succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid business 
decision into a faithless act.”16 Because Delaware law presumes director 
independence,17 shareholders must demonstrate “reasonable doubt” about 
their status.18 To do so, the evidence must demonstrate that a director is 
  
 11. The test can be outcome determinative. See Brown, supra note 6, at 103. See also Nixon 
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is often of critical importance whether a particu-
lar decision is one to which the business judgment rule applies or the entire fairness rule applies. It is 
sometimes thought that the decision whether to apply the business judgment rule or the entire fair-
ness test can be outcome-determinative.”). 
 12. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1242 (Del. 2012) (“[I]n order to 
encourage the use of procedural devices that foster fair pricing, such as special committees and 
minority stockholder approval conditions, this Court has provided transactional proponents with 
what has been described as a ‘modest procedural benefit—the shifting of the burden of persuasion 
on the ultimate issue of entire fairness to the plaintiffs—if the transaction proponents proved, in a 
factually intensive way, that the procedural devices had, in fact, operated with integrity.’”); In re 
Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 7393-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *32 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
26, 2014) (“If the Special Committee were independent, its approval of the Merger would 
shift the burden of proof on the issue of fairness to the Plaintiffs.”). 
 13. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d,779, 785 (Del. 1981). 
 14. See Blaustein v. Lord Balt. Capital Corp., 84 A.3d 954, 958 (Del. 2014) (to excuse de-
mand, “a plaintiff must allege with particularity that a majority of the board 
lacks independence or is otherwise incapable of validly exercising its business judgment”); 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984). 
 15. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 815. 
 18. Reasonable doubt is the proper standard in the context of demand excusal. Rales v. Blas-
band, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993). With respect to substantive review of transactions under the 
duty of loyalty, the party seeking to shift the standard of review has the burden of establishing the 
integrity of the process, including director independence. See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders 
Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 617 (Del. Ch. 2005) (indicating that transactional proponent has 
the burden of showing that the use of the special committee “operated with in-
tegrity”). As a practical matter, the main difference may be the right to discov-
ery that more often arises in the context of challenges to special committees. See 
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 645 (discovery appropriate where shareholder can 
 
66 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 92 
controlled by or “beholden to” an interested director or controlling 
shareholder.19  
The broad test, notwithstanding, the Delaware courts analyze inde-
pendence almost entirely in the context of financial leverage.20 Allega-
tions of control typically arise out of material income streams that an 
interested director or controlling shareholder can terminate.21 As a result, 
directors serving as officers at the same company typically lack inde-
pendence.22 Similarly, directors receiving material compensation as con-
sultants will not qualify.23 Payments made to an entity can also trigger a 
loss of independence to the extent the payments result in a material bene-
fit to the director.24  
In determining materiality, courts rely on a subjective “actual per-
son” standard.25 Plaintiffs must, therefore, relate the importance of the 
payment to the director’s specific financial circumstances.26 The burden 
of doing so can be particularly difficult for payments that indirectly ben-
efit directors.27  
  
show a “reasonably conceivable set of facts” showing that the conditions for a special committee 
are not present). 
 19. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d at 936 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815). 
 20. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995). 
 21. Brown, supra note 6, at 72. 
 22. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d at 937 (“Because of their alleged substantial financial 
interest in maintaining their employment positions, there is a reasonable doubt that these two direc-
tors are able to consider impartially an action that is contrary to the interests of the Rales brothers.”); 
In re Ltd., Inc. S'holder Litig., 2002 WL 537692, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (director who also 
served as corporation's chief administrative officer lacked independence to evaluate demand against 
the chairman and CEO); California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2002 WL 
31888343, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (“Coulter's position as White's superior alone would be 
sufficiently material to give reason to doubt White's independence from Coulter.”). 
 23. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 30 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting even though there is no bright-
line dollar amount to which consulting fees received by a director become material the court may 
reasonably infer that $75,000 would be material); In re Ltd., Inc., No. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding annual consulting fees of $150,000 material). But see Orman 
v. Cullman, 794 A.2d at 29–30 (Director Bernbach was a consultant of the company but also a large 
shareholder. The court suggested that sometimes a director might not lose his independence if his 
interests are aligned with shareholders.). 
 24. Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2006 WL 1388744, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006) 
(stating the inquiry into independence turns on whether the business relationship with the vendor 
was material to the vendor or the director himself).  
 25. See Kahn, 88 A.3d at 649 (“The inquiry must be whether, applying a subjective standard, 
those ties were material, in the sense that the alleged ties could have affected the impartiality of the 
individual director.”). 
 26. See Brown, supra note 6, at 72. 
 27. When a company makes payments to another entity, plaintiffs must establish the material-
ity of the payments to the director, which is not easy to do. See Brown, supra note 6, at 76. Material-
ity may be inferred where the payments are considerable in relation to the size of the recipient com-
pany, and the director is a leader or owner. See Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 WL 
2266566, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (stating Priceline was one of the company’s two largest 
clients with a five year contract involving minimum payments of $5 million) rev'd, 906 A.2d 776 
(Del. 2006). Frequently these cases also involve payments to law firms. See In re Emerging 
Commc'ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“Vi-
telco represented the largest portion of ECM's business and accounted for approximately 88% of its 
revenues.”). Alternatively, a plaintiff must demonstrate a connection between the payments and the 
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The Delaware courts have also recognized that some personal ties 
could result in a loss of independence. For the most part, however, they 
were limited to family relationships.28 For example, in Mizel v. Connelly, 
the court found that a grandson of the chairman and CEO was not inde-
pendent.29 Likewise, in Harbor Financial Partners v. Huizenga, reason-
able doubt existed about the independence of a brother-in-law. 30 
The courts have been less willing to find that other types of personal 
and outside business relationships disqualify directors as independent.31 
In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that “long-
standing personal and business ties” could not “overcome the presump-
tion of independence that all directors . . . [were] afforded.” 32 Thereafter, 
lower courts were, with one anomalous exception,33 unwilling to find 
  
director’s compensation. See In re CompuCom Sys., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 499-N, 2005 WL 
2481325, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005) (“The plaintiff does not allege what compensation Loe-
wenberg and/or JDL Enterprises obtained for Loewenberg's advisory services, nor does the com-
plaint allege that such fees constituted such a large part of his or the firm's income so as to be mate-
rial to Loewenberg or JDL Enterprises. The plaintiff merely states conclusory allegations which do 
not support a reasonable inference that Loewenberg lacked independence.”).  
 28. See In re Ltd., Inc., No. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) 
(noting that wife stood to benefit from transaction that aided spouse); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 
1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (finding that familial interest is a basis for demand excusal), overruled in 
part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 29. No. Civ. A. 16638, 1999 WL 550369, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999). Not all family rela-
tionships will result in a loss of independence. See also Seibert v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 
No. Civ. A. 6639, 1984 WL 21874, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (director was independent of 
cousin when considering demand against him). 
 30. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 889 (Del. Ch. 1999). Nonetheless, the 
cases have not always been consistent. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“Without backtracking from these general propositions, it would be less than can-
did if I did not admit that Delaware courts have applied these general standards in a manner that has 
been less than wholly consistent. Different decisions take a different view about the bias-producing 
potential of family relationships, not all of which can be explained by mere degrees of consanguini-
ty.”). 
 31. See Cal. Pub. Emps' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ. A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (noting that an allegation of a lifelong friendship with an interested party is 
not alone sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of a director's disinterest or independence); Kohls v. 
Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1284 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that a friendship between a member of a 
special committee of the board and an interested party to the challenged transaction, as well as the 
fact that the interested party had once given the director a summer job, were insufficient to challenge 
the director's ability to exercise his independent judgment with respect to the transaction); Benerofe 
v. Cha, No. 14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1998) (providing that an allegation of a 
longtime friendship was not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director's ability to exer-
cise his judgment independently of his friend). 
 32. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 355 (Del. Ch. 1998) aff'd in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 33. The one exception occurred in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig, 824 A.2d at 917. 
Shareholders filed a derivative complaint alleging insider trading during the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2001 by four Oracle directors including the CEO. Id. at 920. Discovery uncovered a number of 
connections among the directors and management. Id. at 931–35. For example, Oracle’s CEO, as the 
head of a charitable foundation, donated $10 million to Stanford. Id. at 932. In addition, around the 
time the special litigation committee members joined the board the CEO publicly discussed donating 
his $100 million house as well as $170 million for a scholarship program to the University. Id. at 
933–35. The chancery court concluded that the connections described in the opinion “would weigh 
on the mind of a reasonable special litigation committee member deciding whether to level the 
serious charge of insider trading against the [t]rading [d]efendants.” Id. at 947. A subsequent deci-
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that non-familial, personal relationships impaired independence,34 alt-
hough some acknowledged the possibility.35   
III. BEAM EX REL. MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA, INC. V. 
STEWART 
The Delaware Supreme Court revisited personal and outside busi-
ness relationships in Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, 
Inc. v. Stewart.
36
 There the court effectively reversed the analysis in 
Brehm and found that such relationships could in fact result in a loss of 
independence. In that case, Martha Stewart owned 94% of Omnimedia 
and served as the CEO.37 Following charges that Stewart engaged in in-
sider trading, shareholders filed a derivative action alleging that the 
board failed to adequately supervise her behavior.38 In an effort to 
demonstrate demand excusal, shareholders contested the independence of 
some members of the board on the basis of outside business and personal 
relationships.39  
  
sion, however, suggested that the analysis should be read narrowly. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1054–55 (Del. 2004). 
 34. See Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ. A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 
2003) (holding “mere personal friendship” does not raise reasonable doubt as to director independ-
ence); In re Paxson Commc'n Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. Civ. A. 17568, 2001 WL 812028, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2001) (holding generalized allegations of close personal ties do not negate 
director independence); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979–80 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (holding an allegation of fifteen-year professional and personal relation failed to adequately 
plead the facts necessary to survive a motion to dismiss); Green v. Phillips, No. Civ. A. 14436, 1996 
WL 342093, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1996) (holding suggestions of longstanding personal ties are 
insufficient to impair independence).  
 35. See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) (“[a] controlled director is 
one who is dominated by another party, whether through close personal or familial relationship or 
through force of will”); Orman, 794 A.2d at 27 n.55 (citing In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. Shareholders 
Litig., 15779-NC, 2001 WL 755133, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001) (“[a]lthough mere recitation of 
the fact of past business or personal relationships will not make the Court automatically question the 
independence of a challenged director, it may be possible to plead additional facts concerning the 
length, nature or extent of those previous relationships that would put in issue that director's ability 
to objectively consider the challenged transaction.”); In re New Valley Corp., No. Civ. A. 17649, 
2001 WL 50212, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2001) (holding a majority of New Valley’s current Board is 
not independent because the facts alleged in the complaint show that all the members of the current 
Board have current or past business, personal, and employment relationships with each other and the 
entities involved); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“a fiduciary may act 
disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal pecuniary interest; and (2) that, regardless of 
his motive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders 
may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.”); Chesapeake Corp. 
v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 299 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Unitrin defines an independent director as one 
who can base her judgments on the corporate merits without being influenced by extraneous influ-
ences, such as personal relationships the director has with management or a controlling stockholder, 
or other material financial relationships the director has with the corporation.”). 
 36. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 845 A.2d at 1040. 
 37. Id. at 1051.  
 38. Plaintiff also made allegations arising out of the sale of shares of Omnimedia and the 
“board’s decisions with regard to the provision of ‘split-dollar’ insurance for Stewart.” Beam ex rel. 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 968 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
 39. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 845 A.2d at 1051. 
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With respect to one director, Darla Moore, the plaintiffs alleged a 
number of personal connections with Stewart.40 Moore allegedly attend-
ed a wedding reception with Stewart hosted by Stewart’s personal law-
yer.41 Additionally, Fortune magazine published an article highlighting 
their close personal friendship.42 Although describing the matter as a 
“close call,” the chancery court found that the facts did not rebut the pre-
sumption of director independence.43 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court conceded that a variety of 
motivations could impair independence, but “mere personal friendship” 
was not enough.44 The alleged relationship between Stewart and Moore 
arose out of “structural bias” which “presuppose[d] that the professional 
and social relationships that naturally develop[ed] among members of a 
board impede[d] independent decisionmaking.”45 Such allegations were 
inadequate to defeat a motion to dismiss.46 Instead, a plaintiff had to al-
lege facts that would support the inference that the “non-interested direc-
tor would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the rela-
tionship with the interested director.”47  
The decision gave no guidance on the application of the test. The 
court did not describe the types of personal or outside business relation-
ships that would cause a director to risk his or her professional reputa-
tion. As a result, courts continued to routinely dismiss such allegations.48 
Thus, in Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the independence of directors serving on a committee considering 
the sale of preferred stock issued by Benihana to BFC Financial Corpora-
tion. 49 Plaintiffs alleged that one director of Benihana was interested in 
  
 40. Id. at 1047. 
 41. Id. at 1045. 
 42. Id.  
 43. The plaintiff also challenged the independence of another director, Martinez. Id. The 
plaintiff presented evidence that before he was a director at Omnimedia, Martinez served as chair-
man and CEO of Sears Roebuck and Co. (“Sears”). Id. While at Sears, Martinez established a rela-
tionship with Omnimedia, which marketed a significant volume of Omnimedia merchandise through 
Sears. Id. Additionally, a longtime mutual friend of Martinez and Stewart recruited him to the board. 
Id. Lastly, in an article featured in Directors & Boards, another director remarked that Martinez was 
an old friend of both Stewart and her. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court held the factual allegations 
regarding Stewart’s friendship with Martinez were inadequate to raise a reasonable doubt of his 
independence. Id. at 1051. 
 44. Id. at 1050.  
 45. Id. at 1050–51.  
 46. Id. at 1051. 
 47. Id. at 1052. 
 48. See Gatz v. Ponsoldt, No. Civ.A 174-N, 2004 WL 3029868, at *3 n.9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 
2004) (holding conclusory allegations that a director on a special litigation committee and an inter-
ested party had significant prior business dealings did not demonstrate the director had “an inability 
to consider impartially issues related to potential transgressions involving” the interested party); In 
re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6623–VCN, 2013 WL 396202, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (holding allegations that a director had a long-term personal relationship with the 
CEO was not the type of allegation that raised a reasonable doubt as to the director’s independence 
under Delaware law).  
 49. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 178–79 (Del. Ch. 2005) aff'd, 
906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006). 
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the BFC transaction.50 In contending that another director lacked inde-
pendence, plaintiffs asserted both had been close friends for forty to for-
ty-five years and “met every ten to fourteen days.”51 Applying Beam, the 
chancery court found that the evidence demonstrated only that the direc-
tors “had a longstanding friendship” and that such a relationship was not 
sufficient to show a “lack [of] independence[.]”52 
Similarly, in Khanna v. McMinn, plaintiffs alleged two directors 
had a long-time friendship.53 They owned “homes in the same neighbor-
hood and had ‘neighboring wineries’” in St. Helena, Napa.54 Employing 
the Beam test, the chancery court dismissed the complaint without dis-
covery, holding the directors may be close, “but allegations of this nature 
do not allow a reasonable inference that the exercise of a director’s dis-
cretion and judgment is impaired.”55 
IV. SETTING STANDARDS  
Shareholders continued to contest director independence on the ba-
sis of personal and outside business relationships. In a pair of recent cas-
es, the Delaware courts for the first time provided some insight into the 
types of connections that could result in a loss of independence.  
a. In re MFW Shareholders Litig.  
In In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, stockholders challenged a 
going-private merger between M & F Worldwide (MFW) and MacAn-
drews & Forbes, a controlling shareholder owned by Ronald Perelman. 56 
The complaint alleged that one of the special litigation committee (SLC) 
members had a friendship and business relationship with Perelman since 
the 1990s,57 and “[had] been to Perelman’s house.”58 
The chancery court reiterated that “mere allegations of mere friend-
ship” were not enough to show a lack of independence.59 Instead, a plain-
tiff must allege facts showing that “the director in question’s material ties 
  
 50. Id. at 176.  
 51. Id. at 178–79. 
 52. Id. at 179. 
 53. Khanna v. McMinn, No. Civ.A 20545–NC, 2006 WL 1388744, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 9, 
2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 499 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 57. Id. at 511. 
 58. Another MacAndrews & Forbes representative sat on the Board of Visitors of the 
Georgetown University Law Center, where one of the SLC members was a tenured professor. Id. at 
511–13. That representative had requested that the professor “join the board of another Perelman 
corporation, Revlon, in 2012.” Id. at 512. Lastly, a different SLC member had “known Perelman 
since at least 1988, when Perelman invested in failed thrifts with the banker Gerald L. Ford,” where 
the SLC director was the “President and Chief Operating Officer of their investment vehicles.” Id. at 
513. According to the plaintiffs, this director “and Perelman both made a ‘significant’ amount of 
money” when the thrifts “sold to Citigroup for $5 billion in 2002.” Id.  
 59. Id. at 509 n.37.   
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to the person whose proposal or actions she is evaluating are sufficiently 
substantial that she cannot objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties.”60 In 
dicta, the court described the type of facts necessary to meet the standard, 
stating:   
the friendship was one where the parties had served as each other's 
maids of honor, had been each other's college roommates, shared a 
beach house with their families each summer for a decade, and are as 
thick as blood relations, that context would be different from parties 
who occasionally had dinner over the years, go to some of the same 
parties and gatherings annually, and call themselves “friends.”
61
 
Plaintiffs, however, failed, “despite receiving the chance for extensive 
discovery,” to produce the facts necessary to rebut the presumption of 
independence.62 
b. In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litig. 
Although In re MFW Shareholders Litigation did not find a loss of 
independence, the court provided a framework for examining personal 
relationships. Relying on this analysis, the court in In re Orchard Enter-
prises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,63 found that shareholders had suffi-
ciently alleged an issue of fact as to the loss of independence between a 
director and a controlling shareholder as a result, in part, of personal 
connections.64  
Orchard Enterprises, Inc. (Orchard) distributed “music and video 
through digital stores and mobile carriers.”65 Dimensional Associates, 
LLC (Dimensional), a private equity fund, had controlled the company 
since 200766 and designated a majority of the directors on the seven-
person board.67 Joseph Samberg founded the parent of Dimensional and 
served as a senior executive officer of Dimensional.68  
In 2009, Dimensional delivered a formal proposal to Orchard to buy 
out the minority shareholders “for $1.68 per share, a 25% premium to the 
then-current stock price.”69  In response, the Orchard board formed a 
special committee and appointed Donahue, a director designated by Di-
mensional, to serve as Chair.70 According to the court, Donahue “acted 
  
 60. Id. at 509. 
 61. Id. at 509 n.37. 
 62. Id. at 510.   
 63. In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 9 (Del. Ch. 2014).  
 64. Id. at 21. 
 65. Id. at 8. 
 66. Id. (noting that Dimensional held “53.3% of Orchard’s outstanding voting power”).  
 67. Id. 
 68. According to the court, “Joseph Samberg . . . . controls Dimensional.” Id. at 21.  
 69. Id. at 9. 
 70. Id. at 8–9.  
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as the point man for Orchard in negotiating with [Dimensional]”71 and 
received greater compensation than other members for his role as Chair 
of the special committee and later, the CEO search committee.72 The 
special committee ultimately approved an offer at $2.05 a share, and the 
merger closed on July 29, 2010.73 
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duties arising from 
this cash-out merger.74 In doing so, the shareholders challenged the inde-
pendence of the special committee.75 After discovery, shareholders un-
covered facts suggesting that Donahue had “long-standing ties to mem-
bers of the Samberg family.”76 As the court described: 
Donahue and Jeff Samberg, who is Joseph's brother, have been busi-
ness associates and personal friends for approximately twenty years. 
They attended the NCAA Final Four together every year from 1999 
to 2008, and they have invested together in fifteen different compa-
nies, either directly or through Greylock Partners, a venture capital 




The past business and social connections between Donahue and the 
Samberg family, coupled with the evidence concerning Donahue’s pos-
sible consulting work for Dimensional after the closing of the merger, 
and his prominent role in the negotiating process, created a “gray” issue 
for the court regarding independence.78 Accordingly, the chancery court 
concluded that “the facts surrounding Donahue's relationships with the 
Samberg family and Dimensional should be determined at trial, rather 
than through summary judgment.”79 The case, however, settled before 
the matter could definitively resolve the independence issue.80 
  
 71. Id. at 26 (evidence indicated that Donahue “chaired the Special Committee, served as the 
Committee's principal negotiator, and acted as the central conduit for the flow of information to and 
from the Committee.”).  
 72. Id. (“Evidencing [Donahue’s] greater responsibilities, he received compensation of 
$80,000 for serving as Chair of the Special Committee and the CEO search committee. Other direc-
tors who served as members of both committees received only $15,000.”).  
 73. Id. at 13–15.  
 74. Id. at 7.  
 75. Id. at 24–26.  
 76. Id. at 9.  
 77. Additional evidence suggested that Donahue may have contacted Dimensional about 
serving as a consultant to Orchard following the transaction. Id. (“Discovery further revealed that 
during the negotiation of the merger, Donahue approached Dimensional about serving as a consult-
ant to Orchard after the merger closed. He got the job and provided post-closing consulting services 
for annual compensation of approximately $108,000.”).  
 78. Id. at 25–26.   
 79. Id. at 28.   
 80. In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 7840–VCL, 2014 WL 4181912, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2014) (“The case settled for a payment by the defendants of $10,725,000 to the 
class.”).   
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V. IMPACT OF IN RE ORCHARD ENTERPRISES, INC. STOCKHOLDER LITIG. 
a. Delaware Law 
The case provided insight into the factors that may impair director 
independence on the basis of outside business and non-family personal 
relationships.81 First, social interactions may raise concerns where they 
are regular and longstanding rather than occasional and infrequent. The 
alleged closeness of Donahue’s personal relationship with Jeff Samberg 
involved a twenty-year friendship and shared vacations over a protracted 
period including attending the NCAA Final Four together for 10 consec-
utive years.  
Second, the strength of the relationship matters. Donahue had a re-
lationship with Arthur Samberg, the father, suggesting the Sambergs 
viewed Donahue as a close family friend. Finally, Donahue and Jeff 
Samberg allegedly invested in fifteen different companies together illus-
trating the substantiality of their relationship.  
The court’s decision also implied that independence has a temporal 
or circumstantial component.82 Donahue’s heightened compensation in 
comparison to other committee members insinuated that he played a 
more active role in the work of the special committee. Additionally, the 
chancery court emphasized Donahue’s position as Chair of the special 
committee.83  
Moreover, the case demonstrated the possible risks that could occur 
when directors fail to adequately weigh personal relationships when ap-
pointing members to a special committee. In part because of the issue 
over independence, the court found that the burden of persuasion with 
  
 81. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Director Independence, Personal Relationships, and the Beach 
House Standard: In re Orchard (Part 3), RACE TO THE BOTTOM (May 26, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/independent-directors. 
 82. The plaintiffs’ access to discovery regarding director independence in In re Orchard 
Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation influenced the court’s decision to deny the motion for sum-
mary judgment. The original complaint revealed that the plaintiffs knew nothing about Donahue’s 
past business and social connections with the Samberg family before discovery. See Complaint, In re 
Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 7840). However, when a 
special committee moves to dismiss a derivative action, the court may order limited discovery to 
determine the independence of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Zapata Corp. 
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (1981). Importantly, in In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stock-
holder Litigation the plaintiffs were offered an opportunity for discovery related to independence. 88 
A.3d at 9. This procedural distinction may be outcome-determinative, because it allows plaintiffs to 
plead particularized facts sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss unlike a demand-excusal case 
where the shareholders have little chance to obtain the information needed to rebut the presumption 
of director independence. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1055 (2004) (en banc).  
 83. Donahue’s position on the Special Committee arguably did not go to independence but to 
his influence in the negotiation process. Had Donahue played a less critical role in the committee, 
the court may have been less willing to conclude that the personal connections deprived the commit-
tee of the traditional deference. See supra note 71. 
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respect to entire fairness remained with the defendants.84 As a result, the 
court did not apply the duty of care or the exculpatory clause from Or-
chard’s certificate of incorporation.85 The director defendants therefore 
confronted the risk of personal liability and the potential burden of a tri-
al.86 
b. Disclosure Requirements under the Federal Securities Laws 
The standards set out in In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation may affect the disclosure obligations of public companies. 
Under Item 407 of Regulation S-K, a listed company must disclose the 
identity of each director or nominee determined to be independent under 
applicable stock exchange listing criteria.87 In addition, disclosure must 
include, by specific category or type, any transaction, relationship, or 
arrangement with any of the company’s independent directors considered 
by the board but ultimately disregarded in determining the independence 
of the director.88 
In considering relationships that could deprive directors of inde-
pendence, boards of listed companies have not always contemplated 
business and personal relationships between directors and management.89 
  
 84. In addition to the issue of independence, shareholders raised other concerns over the 
process used by the special committee. See In re Orchard, 88 A.3d at 28 (“Leaving aside the ques-
tion of Dimensional‘s intentions, the plaintiffs have pointed to evidence which raises litigable ques-
tions about the Special Committee‘s negotiation process.”).  
 85. Id. at 37. 
 86. Commentators, generally, have not emphasized personal connections in their analysis of 
In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. See Stephen B. Amdur et al., Entire Fairness 
in Controlling Stockholder Transaction: In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 
M&A CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP), Mar. 2014, available at 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-in-re-orchard-enterprises; see also David N. Shine, 
Delaware Decision Reinforces Need for Proper Procedure in Squeeze-Out Merger, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 20, 2014, 9:04 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/20/delaware-decision-reinforces-need-for-proper-
procedure-in-squeeze-out-merger/#more-61061 (“In Orchard, the lead director on the special com-
mittee had continuing social contacts with the controlling stockholder, and, most troubling to the 
Court, had arranged for a post-merger consulting agreement with the corporation.”).  
 87. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(2) (2014).  
 88. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a)(3). Under the SEC’s original proposal for Item 407, a compa-
ny would have had to disclose the specific details of each such transaction, relationship or arrange-
ment. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-
8732A; 34-54302A, 2006 WL 6325877 (August 29, 2006). In response to commenters, the SEC 
revised the disclosure requirement in the final rule to permit the relationships of each director to be 
described by the specific category or type. Id. The rule requires the disclosure be made on a “director 
by director basis” and the description of the category or type “be sufficiently detailed so that the 
nature of the transactions, relationships or arrangements is readily apparent.” Id.   
 89. The plain language of the NYSE listing standards, directs boards determining director 
independence to consider whether directors have a "material relationship with the listed company". 
NYSE, supra note 2, § 303A.02. In 2010, Black & Decker issued a press release in connection with 
a special meeting of stockholders held to approve its merger with The Stanley Works stating, 
"[p]ersonal business relationships between individuals (as opposed to relationships with the compa-
ny) generally are not relevant to the independence tests under the New York Stock Exchange rules 
because they do not create a material relationship between a director and the company." Press Re-
lease, Black & Decker, Black & Decker Provides Additional Information in Connection With the 
Special Meetings of Stockholders to Consider the Stanley Transaction (Mar. 9, 2010) (on file with 
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The stock exchanges and the Commission, however, have clarified that a 
board does have an obligation to consider these types of relationships 
when determining director independence.90  
In altering its listing standards, the NYSE recently added a new 
subsection affirmatively requiring that the board “consider all factors 
specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship 
to the listed company which is material to the director’s ability to be in-
dependent from management in connection with the duties of a compen-
sation committee member[.]”91 In addition, the SEC noted that compa-
nies must consider business and personal relationships. As the SEC stat-
ed: 
Although personal and business relationships, related party transac-
tions, and other matters suggested by commenters are not specified 
either as bright-line disqualifications or explicit factors that must be 
considered in evaluating a director’s independence, the Commission 
believes that compliance with NYSE’s rules and the provision noted 
above would demand consideration of such factors with respect to 
compensation committee members, as well as to all Independent Di-
rectors on the board.
92
 
The standards emphasized the need to consider personal relation-
ships but did not provide guidance on the types of connections or ties 
that might result in a loss of independence. In re Orchard Enterprises, 
Inc. Stockholder Litigation, however, offers some guidance. First, a 
company should consider and possibly disclose frequent social interac-
tions between directors or any member of their immediate family and 
members of the company’s senior management or their affiliates. Sec-
ond, a company should consider the length of the relationships between 
directors and executives and whether the parties consider their relation-
ships strong and family-like.  
  
author). The NYSE disapproved of Black & Decker’s explanation of its rule and required the com-
pany to issue the following statement: “the NYSE advised Black & Decker that, in interpreting its 
rules, the NYSE believes relationships between a director and a member of senior management that 
are material to either party should be considered by a board of directors in its evaluation of a direc-
tor’s independence.” Press Release, Black & Decker, Black & Decker Issues Further Statement in 
Connection with the Special Meetings of Stockholders to Consider the Stanley Transaction (Mar. 10, 
2010) (on file with author). In sum, the NYSE’s interpretation was unclear from the plain language 
of its listing standards. 
 90. See infra notes 91-92. 
 91. NYSE, supra note 2, § 303A.02(a)(ii). Similarly, under the Nasdaq Listing Rule 
5602(a)(2), a director is considered independent if the director is not an officer or employee of the 
listed company, and the listed company’s board affirmatively determines that the director does not 
have any relationship which would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying 
out the responsibilities of a director.  
 92. Self-regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639, 2013 WL 166322 
(Jan. 11, 2013).  
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c. Empirical Insight 
Given the guidance from the SEC and the requirements of the ex-
changes, some public companies have expressly recognized the need to 
consider personal relationships.  For example, Compass Minerals Inter-
national Inc.’s 2014 Proxy Statement stated that in determining director 
independence “the Board of Directors broadly considers the relevant 
facts and circumstances, including: the nature of any relationships with 
the Company, including personal and business relationships as well as 
any relationships with the director's employer or any company on whose 
board the director serves[.]”93 Likewise, Worthington Industries Inc.’s 
2014 Proxy Statement specified “[t]he Board has been advised of the 
nature and extent of any direct or indirect personal and business relation-
ship between the Company (including its subsidiaries)” and each “Inde-
pendent Director” or “any entities for which any Independent Director is 
a partner, officer, employee or shareholder.”94   
A review of the disclosures in 2014 by the companies in the S&P 
100, however, reveals at best modest disclosure with respect to personal 
and business relationships between directors and officers. Some note the 
need to consider these types of factors. For example, Colgate-Palmolive 
Co.’s 2014 Proxy Statement stated that: 
a director is not considered independent if the director has any rela-
tionship with Colgate or its senior management or with another direc-
tor that in the Board’s judgment may impair the director’s ability to 
make independent judgments. Such relationships could include vot-
ing arrangements and personal, economic or professional ties be-




Similarly, Walt Disney Company’s 2014 Proxy Statement stated the 
board considered “whether there were any transactions or relationships 
between Directors or any member of their immediate family (or any enti-
ty of which a Director or an immediate family member is an executive 
officer, general partner or significant equity holder) and members of the 
Company’s senior management or their affiliates.”96 A handful of com-
panies in the S&P 100 described some outside affiliations between direc-
tors that the companies considered but deemed immaterial.97 For exam-
ple, Oracle’s 2014 Proxy Statement revealed that Stanford University, 
  
 93. Compass Minerals Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 14 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
 94. Worthington Indus., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 10 (Aug. 14, 2014). 
 95. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 6 (Mar. 26, 2014).  
 96. Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 13 (Jan. 24, 2014). 
 97. See Morgan Stanley, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 12 (Mar. 28, 2014) (stating “[a] 
relationship arising solely from a director’s membership in the same professional, social, fraternal or 
religious association or organization, or attendance at the same educational institution, as an execu-
tive officer or director” is not material for purposes of director independence).  
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the employer of two of its directors, received donations from both Oracle 
and various board members.98  
Nonetheless, many companies in the S&P 100 do not expressly state 
whether they have considered personal and business relationships be-
tween directors and management.99 Nor has any company revealed the 
types of relationships at issue in In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stock-
holder Litigation.
100 It may be that such relationships are not present. 
Alternatively, such relationships may be present but not considered by 
the board despite the requirements of the stock exchanges and the 
SEC.101 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, for the first 
time, identified a set of non-familial personal factors that could result in 
the loss of independence. The factors, however, only came to light as a 
result of discovery, something unavailable for most challenges to director 
independence.102 The case, therefore, illustrates the importance of dis-
covery in ascertaining director independence.  
The case also provides a basis for increased disclosure of these 
types of relationships under the federal securities laws. Increased disclo-
sure of personal connections between directors and management would 
likely cause shareholders to focus greater attention on these relation-
ships.103 Increased disclosure may also facilitate legal challenges to di-
rector independence. 104 As a result, increased disclosure could result in a 
reduction in the nomination of directors with personal and business rela-




 98. See Oracle Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 23 (Sept. 23, 2014) (“Dr. Boskin 
and Mr. Garcia-Molina are both employed by Stanford University, which has received donations 
from both Oracle and various Board members.”). 
 99. Robin E. Alexander, S&P 100 Proxy Spreadsheet 2014, U. DENV. STURM C.L. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/independent-director/S-
%20P-100-Proxy-Spreadsheet-2014.xlsx (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).  
 100. See id.  
 101. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2012).  
 102. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the in In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation decision was that the plaintiffs were offered an opportunity for discovery related to inde-
pendence, which allowed plaintiffs to plead particularized facts sufficient to overcome a motion to 
dismiss. Given the usual absence of discovery regarding directors’ business and personal relation-
ships, it seems reasonable to assume there are other directors with disqualifying relationships that 
boards incorrectly characterized as independent. See supra note 82. 
 103. Brown, supra note 81. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
